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FREIGHT FORWARDERS, BROKERAGE, AND SHIPPING
CONFERENCE AGREEMENTS: IMPLICATIONS OF
THE ISBRANDTSEN DOCTRINE
Maritime shipping conferences' have for many years regulated the payment
of marine freight brokerage. 2 The Federal Maritime Board has accepted this
conference practice and extended federal antitrust exemption to it under statutory powers granted the Board in the Shipping Act of 1916.3 The Supreme
Court's application of Section 14 Third of the Shipping Act in FederalMaritime
Board v. Isbrandtsen4 suggests that the Board's policy approving conference
brokerage rules requires reconsideration where such rules affect independent
liner competitors of conferences.
Prior to Isbrandtsen the Federal Maritime Board had a free hand in the
formulation of national maritime policy concerning conference activities. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts were loath to pit their judgment against that of the Board.5 In Isbrandlsen the Court struck down a Boardapproved conference dual-rate shipping contract system the purpose and effect
of which was the elimination of independent competition on the conference's
route. This decision overturned a long standing Board policy approving dual
rates, and, by implication, the elimination in this manner of independents. The
Court held that Section 14 Third of the Shipping Act prohibits dual rate contracts where their effect upon independent competition is "predatory" in purpose and effect. 6 The Board argued unsuccessfully that its powers under the act
permitted approval of any conference practice not specifically outlawed by the
act. Isbrandtsensuggests that the Court reads section 14 as a further limitation
upon the Board's power to give conference activities antitrust exemption. The
case would appear to stand for the proposition that conference action is limited
I Shipping conferences are loosely organized associations of steamship companies operating
regularly scheduled sailings on a trade route. Each route has its own conference, and many
steamship companies participate in more than one conference. Conference operations are confined to liner commerce. Maritime commerce is broadly divided into two categories: tramp
and liner operations. Tramps carry primarily bulk cargoes, liners primarily dry package cargo.
Because of the difference in cargoes, liners are considered non-competitive. See McGee, Ocean
Freight Rate Conferences and the American Merchant Marine, 27 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 191, 205
(1960).
I See note 15 infra, for a discussion of the Board's definition of brokerage.
3 64 Stat. 1274, 1277 (1950), 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1958). Section 15 of the act provides for the
filing of conference agreements with the Board. The Board may disapprove, cancel, or modify
any filed agreement found by it "unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers or ports.. . or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the
United States." Conference agreements approved under this section are exempt from the provisions of the antitrust laws.
4 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
6 See Comment, Primary Jurisdiction and the Applicability of Antitrust Remedies in the
Shipping Industry, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 598 (1959).
6 356 U.S. 481, 492-93 (1958).
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to agreements controlling competition among conference members and may not
be used to control competition within the industry generally. Read in this way,
the Board's powers of approval are limited to conference practices affecting only
competition within the conference structure itself. Application of this view of
Isbrandtsen to conference brokerage rules indicates that Board policy statements approving brokerage regulations may be too broad. A study of the
Board's position is especially appropriate today in light of the uncertain status
of brokerage policy,7 and of indications that Board attitudes in this area are
undergoing change.
I. BROKERAGE PRACTICES AND THEIR EFFECT ON LINER COMPETITION

Brokerage is the fee paid by carriers to independent middlemen-brokers for
securing cargo for the carrier's ships. Brokerage provides an incentive to the
broker to direct cargo to the paying carrier. 8 Typically brokerage is estimated as
a percentage of the freight charged on the directed shipment. On American
trade routes this percentage traditionally has been 11 per cent of the freight. 9
Liner commerce has for many years been overtonnaged and ships in recent years
have rarely sailed with full cargoes.10 For this reason, brokers controlling the
designation of carriers in this industry are in a particularly strategic position.
They are able to take advantage of actual or latent competition among carriers
to increase their brokerage earnings. Much of the litigation before the Board in
recent years has centered around the interrelationship of carrier competition
1
and brokerage.
7

See notes 49 to 54 infra, and accompanying text.
8 "The overwhelming conclusion drawn from the record is that brokerage is primarily a
competitive device, utilized by the carriers to attract to themselves as much as possible of the
traffic as to which the forwarders, by authorization of their shipper clients, control the routing." Examiner's Preliminary Report, Docket No. 831 F.M.B. at 32 (March, 1960).
9 Brokerage rates in other parts of the world tend to be higher than American rates. See
Appendix, European Brokerage Rates, Hearings on Freight Forwarders and Brokers, 84th
Cong. 1st & 2d Siss. (1956). There is considerable evidence that brokerage rates on American
routes increase when there is competition between an independent and a conference. Hearings
Before the Special Subcommittee on Steamship Conferences of the House Committee on the MerchantMarine and Fisheries,86th Cong., 1st. Sess., pt. I, at 13-14 (1959) (statement of Clarence
Morse, Chairman, Federal Maritime Board); pt. II, at 356-57 (testimony of Mr. Wierda, a
shipping company executive); at 443 (testimony of Mr. Coron, a freight forwarder).
10 Cargo capacity in liner commerce has exceeded actual cargo by 44 per cent in recent
years. Comment, 11 STAN. L. REv. 136, 138-39 (1958).
n These cases are discussed in part T1 infra.In other cases the Board has been concerned
with shippers collecting brokerage under the guise of being forwarders. Samuel Kaye-Collection of Brokerage/Misclassification, 5 F.M.B. 385 (1958); Brokerage on Ocean Freight-Max
Lepack, 5 F.M.B. 435 (1958; Luis (Louis) A. Pereirra-Collection of Brokerage, 5 F.M.B. 400
(1958). The Board has found this practice a violation of section 10 of the act, which prohibits
the obtaining of water transportation at less than the applicable charge. In American Union
Transport v. River Plate & Brazil Conf., 5 F.M.B. 216 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. (1958), the
Board found that forwarders rendering forwarding services without charge, relying on brokerage for compensation, also violated section 16 by permitting shippers to receive transportation
at less than the applicable rate.
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Industry practice regarding brokerage is complicated by the relationship that
exists between freight brokers and freight forwarders. The freight forwarder,
2
similar in many respects to his domestic rail and air forwarder counterparts,
is an independent shippers' agent administering and supervising the delivery,
documentation and other administrative details of export shipment'13 In many
cases the freight forwarder and broker are identical business entities. Forwarders engage in brokerage activities as an ordinary incident of their forwarding
services while administering a shipment. The result has been a duality in the
business relationships and sources of income of the forwarding industry. 4 On
some shipments forwarders act as both forwarding agents for shippers and brokers for carriers. On others, the shipper himself arranges water carriage for the
goods and the forwarder performs his services exclusively for the shipper as a
forwarding agent. Industry practice does not adhere to any rigid separation of
forwarder and broker functions, and the practice has developed of carriers paying brokerage on every shipment handled by a forwarder."5 This payment of
"automatic" brokerage is a competitive device within the liner industry. It provides an added incentive to forwarders, as brokers, to direct cargo under their
control to paying lines, and enables conference carriers to evade conference
rules establishing uniform maximum rates at which brokerage can be paid by
member lines.
The conferences have not been unaware of the competitive use of brokerage
in the industry, or of its potentially destructive effect upon conference structure.
Conferences exist for the purpose of controlling the price at which liner shipping
services will be offered to shippers." Control is accomplished by a cartel-like
12For a legal history of the development of domestic forwarding, see Elggren, What Part
Shall FreightForwardersHave in the Development of the Air FreightIndustry?, 14 J. oF Mn L. &
Conx. 170, 171-96 (1947).
23See Mum, TnE FoREiGN FREiGHT FORwARDER (1957); Port of New York Freight
Forwarder Investigation, 3 U.S.M.C. 1957 (1949).
14 Forwarders received $11,109,181 in brokerage payments in 1957. This amount was 31 per
cent of the industry's net income in that year. Examiner's Preliminary Report, Docket No.
831 F.M.B. at 12-13 (March, 1960).
1
5Id.at 26, 30. Brokerage is not defined in the Shipping Act. The Board has adopted the
definition that brokerage, properly earned, "is compensation for securing cargo for the ship."
Agreements and Practices Re Brokerage, 3 U.S.M.C. 170, 172 (1949). The forwarders have
argued that forwarding services, as such, are beneficial to the carriers and thus entitle them to
brokerage on every shipment handled. See Hearingson Freight Forwardersand Brokers, supra
note 9. See also Examiner's Preliminary Report, Docket No. 831 F.M.B. at 31-32 (March,
1960), for a summary of the positions taken by forwarders, conferences and the Board. Even
in Agreements and Practices Re Brokerage, 3 U.S.M.C. 170 (1949), the Board case most favorable to forwarders, the Board found that forwarder services are "primarily for shippers, and
the carrier's benefit is incidental." Id. at 175. This view was recently affirmed in American
Union Transp., Inc. v. River Platte & Brazil Conf., 5 F.M.B. 216 (1957); American Union
Transp., Inc. v. United States, 257 F.2d. 607 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 828 (1958). Pending legislation would adopt the forwarder's view and redefine brokerage so as to authorize
payment on every forwarder-handled shipment. H. R. RE,'. No. 798, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959) (H.R 5068, Providing for the Licensing of Independent Foreign Freight Forwarders).
16See McGee, supra note 1, at 210-13.
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structure establishing uniform conference rates for these services.17 Insofar as
alternative shipping services are unavailable or unsuited to shipper needs, the
conferences are able to maintain their rates. 8 Conference organization eliminates direct price competition among member lines, thereby facilitating the
fixing of rates by agreement. Although conference carriers eschew direct price
competition, they remain to an unknown extent competitors for the cargo
actually moving in their trade. 9 The essentially fixed costs of vessel operation
provide an incentive to carriers to maximize the cargo loads of their vessels."0
The latent competitive forces within conferences create a problem of internal
stability which brokerage competition among member lines would exacerbate.
Conferences have for the most part not developed techniques for allocating
available cargo supply among member lines.' Brokerage payment provides an
alternative to price competition, enabling one conference line to secure an
increased share of the cargo in a given trade. By offering to pay brokerage on all
forwarder-handled shipments the paying carrier induces forwarder-brokers to
direct the cargo which they control to that carrier. In an extreme case the diversion of cargo to one conference member, to the detriment of other conference
carriers, might result in the resumption of price competition. It is therefore in
the conferences' interest to minimize brokerage competition among member
lines.
The conferences have nullified the competitive effect of brokerage in much
the same way as they control price competition. Typically conference rules
establish uniform maximum rates at which brokerage may be paid by member
lines. Uniformity avoids competitive advantages achievable through differentials in payment. Uniformity, however, does not wholly eliminate brokerage
as a competitive device. The forwarder-broker relationship provides a means for
evading the conference uniformity rules. Brokerage remains competitive when
any carrier on a route, whether conference or independent, is willing to make
automatic payment on all forwarder-handled shipments. The willingness of any
one carrier to make automatic payment compels payment by its competitors.?
17

Professor Marx, a leading authority on conference structure, considers conferences to be
cartels. MARX, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARTELs: A STuY IN INDusTRIAL SELF-REGULATION BY SHIPPING CONxRENCES (1935). See also McGee, supra note 1, at 196-204.

iaConference rates are, of course, subject to outside economic pressures and are thus
limited by (1) tramp competition, (2) independent liner competition, and (3) the rates that
particular commodities will bear in relation to their overseas markets.
19Cf. McGee, supra note 1, at 230-31.
op. cit. supra note 17, at 20-21.
"Professor McGee suggests that the infrequency with which conferences resort to pooling
arrangements, sailing quotas or other allocating devices indicates that they are considered un20 MARX,

necessary and that only price competition has a significant effect in the industry. McGee, supra
note 1, at 229-31. But see, Testimony of Alex Cocke, Vice-President of Lykes Bros. Steamship
Company, Hearings before tle Special Subcommittee on Steamship Conferences of the House
Committee on the MerchantMarine and Fisheries, 86 Cong. 1st Sess., pt. I at 263 (1959). Mr.

Cocke believes that considerable service competition exists between conference members.
2

Examiner's Preliminary Report, Docket No. 831 F.M.B. at 26, 33 (March, 1960).
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The alternative for a non-paying carrier is discrimination by the forwarders on
those cargoes controlled by them. Few carriers are in a position to ignore this
factor.
The desirability of preventing evasion of the conference rules, and the difficulty of policing the numerous transactions between forwarders and conference
carriers, have led many conferences to adopt rules prohibiting all brokerage
payments.23 Prohibition not only prevents abuses of conference brokerage rules
by members, but also reduces costs to conference members insofar as bona fide
brokerage claims2 4 are denied with the rest. Industry practice indicates that

conferences are able to establish prohibitory rules only where no effective competition exists between conferences and independents, or between competing
conferences. 26 The existence of competition tends to force conference compliance
with the prevailing rate for brokerage. In cases where there is a high degree of
conference overlap in route markets, a tacit acceptance of the traditional 11
2
per cent brokerage seems to have resulted. 1
The main thrust of conference brokerage regulation has been the elimination
of brokerage competition among conference members. In one reported case,2 7
however, the conference rule was designed and applied as a competitive device
against an independent steamship line competitor of the conference. Conferences have found direct price competition with independents costly and difficult.
Engaging in price competition is, of course, directly contrary to the conference
purpose since it results in rate cutting. Independents frequently follow a policy
of setting their rates at a fixed percentage below those of the conference on the
routes on which they compete.2" It is difficult for conferences to meet such a
competitive policy without abandoning conference rates.2 9 Conferences have
2

3 Conferences barring the payment of brokerage through their agreements are listed in
Agreements and Practices Re Brokerage, 3 U.S.M.C. 170, 173 (1949). The practice appears to
be widespread.
24For a discussion of Board definitions of brokerage, see note 15 supra.
2 The conference rule in Pacific Coast Westbound Conf. (Agreement No. 7790), 2 U.S.M.C.
775 (1946), illustrates the point. Conference traffic was placed in two categories: local and overland. Local traffic originated in the geographic area west of the Rockies, and could not be
shipped otherwise than from Pacific coast ports. Overland traffic originated in the area east
of the mountains and was therefore competitive with ports on the Atlantic and Gulf
coasts. The conference did not pay brokerage on local traffic, but did pay 11 per cent on overland shipments, which were subject to competition of conferences on the Gulf and Atlantic.
The rate was comparable to that paid by Atlantic and Gulf conferences. The inference is that
the conference rule was the result of competitive pressure. It is doubtful that conferences can
or would refuse brokerage in a competitive situation. Such a refusal would only worsen the
competitive position of the conference.
21This may be inferred, e.g., from the failure of the competing conferences in Agreement 7790,
supra note 25, to engage in brokerage competition for the overland traffic.
27
Pacific Coast European Conf., 5 F.M.B. 225 (1957).
2 The policy of Isbrandtsen S.S.Co. is typical. Isbrandtsen was generally understood in
the trade to be undercutting the quoted conference price by 10 per cent. Federal Maritime
Board v. Isbrandtsen, 356 U.S. 481, 485 (1958).
21

Id. at 485-87.
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found control over the demand for liner services a more effective device for
meeting and preventing independent competition. Prior to the Shipping Act
the deferred rebate successfully achieved conference control over available
cargo. Shippers engaged in exclusive dealing contracts with conferences in return
for lower rates. The conference charged the normal rate and deferred the rebated
lower charge thereby ensuring continued shipper adherence to the contract.
Deferred rebates were prohibited by the act.30 The dual rate system condemned in Isbrandtsenoperated on a similar principle. Shippers engaging to ship
exclusively aboard conference vessels received a lower rate. The main difference between the two devices was that under dual rates the shipper benefited
immediately from his bargain since he paid only the lower rate. Although dual
rate contracts frequently contained liquidated damage provisions, they proved
less effective than deferred rebates in controlling shippers. Indeed one of the
great struggles in recent years has been the conferences' attempt to plug loopholes by which shippers evaded their dual rate obligations to ship aboard conference vessels." Exclusive dealing contracts, whether deferred rebate or dual
rate, serve the same purpose. Under either, the shipper abandons his right to
choose a non-conference carrier for his goods. The result is the denial to independent lines of all cargo covered by such contracts.
To the extent that conferences are able to compel shipper compliance with
such exclusive dealing arrangements, conferences are able to nullify the competitive impact of independent competition. First, the conference revenue is not
decreased as to controlled cargo since such cargo continues to move aboard conference vessels. Secondly, the denial of controlled cargo tends to increase conference competitive pressure against independents by denying the independent
an effective cargo base upon which to conduct his operation. When cargo is unavailable on a route as a result of exclusive dealing contracts; independents are
forced either to abandon independent competition and join the conference,
or to abandon the route for one more favorable to their operation.
Similar results can be achieved through brokerage rules. Conferences dominate routes on which they operate in terms of number of sailings, cargo capacity
and, generally, gross cargo tonnage actually carried. Conference dominance
continues even in cases where independents have made severe inroads upon the
conference position. 32 As a result, conference brokerage tends to be of markedly
30 72 Stat. 574 (1958), 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1958).
31One device enabling shippers to evade the dual rate contract was shipping in the forwarder's name and receiving through bills of lading issued by the forwarder. The Board found
this an unjust practice in the Port of New York Freight Forwarder Investigation, 3 U.S.M.C.
157 (1949).
' Even in the situation presented in the Isbrandsencase where the competition of the independent, Isbrandtsen, had a severe impact upon the conference, the conference retained 70 per
cent of the cargo carried on the route and made 89 per cent of the sailings. The greater number
of conference vessels and sailings indicates that in most cases conference carriers will continue
to move a preponderance of the cargo.
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greater importance as a source of revenue to forwarder-brokers than that of
independent lines. Where conferences pay "automatic brokerage," as is the
practice on routes on which competition exists, the inducement to the forwarderbrokers to retain conference patronage is particularly strong. As a result of the
relatively greater importance of conference brokerage, the threat of its loss is an
effective device coercing forwarder-brokers into not dealing with independent
lines. 33
In the Pacific Coast European Conf.34 case this coercive pressure was used
by the conference to prevent brokers from dealing with a conference competitor. The conference provided in its rules that member lines would pay
brokerage only to brokers on an approved conference list." Members were forbidden to pay brokerage to unapproved brokers. In 1953, Mitsui S.S. Lines
entered the trade as an independent conference competitor. The conference
amended its rules so as to blacklist and strike from the approved list "any
broker solicit[ing] for, or receiv[ing] brokerage from, a nonconference competitor. ..

."31

The effect of this provision was to force brokers to choose between

dealing with the conference or Mitsui. As a practical matter, the greater amount
and importance of conference brokerage had the effect of channeling all brokercontrolled cargo to the conference. The independent was denied access to cargo
in the hands of brokers in much the same manner as was accomplished by dual
rates.
Here again the forwarder-broker duality complicated the situation. The conference applied its blacklisting against any forwarder receiving brokerage from
the independent regardless of whether or not the forwarder solicited for the
independent.3 Forwarders shipping by an independent carrier at the shipper's
order and receiving automatic brokerage from the independent were struck
from the conference-approved list just as were forwarders actively soliciting for
the independent. Forwarders naturally began to refuse to handle cargo destined
for the independent for fear that they would be blacklisted. 38 The conference
31"Because of the much greater relative importance of the income received as brokerage
from the conference lines it was the unanimous position of the forwarder-broker witnesses that
their only practical choice would be to refuse to handle, as either forwarder or broker, any
shipments moving on a nonconference vessel." Pacific Coast European Conf., 5 F.M.B. 225,

239 (1957).
34 5 F.M.B. 225 (1957).
36

Pacific Coast Tariff No. 12. Rule 21, Freight Brokerage. Id. at app. B.

"Id.

37Id. at 232. (testimony of conference chairman).
" It might be thought that whenever an independent liner substantially undercuts conference rates, shippers and forwarders would take advantage of these rates by arranging for the
forwarder's compensation to come from the shipper. Such an arrangement might take two
forms: (1) the forwarder could decline all brokerage payments from the independent, thus
hoping to avoid conference blacklisting, and the shipper would reimburse the forwarder for
lost brokerage from the independent, or (2) the forwarder could accept independent brokerage,
suffer black-listing by the conference and be reimbursed by the shipper in an amount equal to
the loss of conference patronage and brokerage caused by the blacklisting. It is, however, un-
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rule as applied not only coerced brokers, but also, by denying independent
shippers forwarding services, tended to force shippers to abandon the use of
independent liner services.
I.

POLICY OF T-E FEDERAL MARiTnr

BOARD TOWARD VARIOUS

FoRMs OF CONFERENCE BROiERAGE REGULATIONS

Throughout its history the Federal Maritime Board and its predecessor
agencies have generally adhered to a policy approving conference regulation of
brokerage. The Board has not distinguished between conference regulations the
purpose and effect of which has been the elimination of independent liner
competition, and those affecting competition only within the conferences themselves. The decision in Isbrandtsen appears to rest upon this distinction, suggesting that the breadth of Board approval may be unwarranted.
From 1923 to 1946 the Board's policy was tacitly expressed in its approval
of conference agreements containing brokerage rules. A 1936 dictum suggests
that Board approval during this period extended not only to uniform rates and
prohibitory conference rules, but also to conference use of brokerage as a
41
In Pacific Coast Westbound Conf.
competitive device against independents.
Agreement 7790,41 decided in 1946, the brokers successfully challenged a conference rule prohibiting all brokerage payments on a portion of the conference
traffic. The conferences resisted this shift in Board policy. In the resulting general investigation of brokerage, Agreements and Practices Re Brokerage,42 the

Board affirmed its earlier decision on the ground that prohibition of brokerage
was detrimental to American foreign commerce. The issue in these and other
brokerage cases was not the general question of the validity of brokerage rules,
likely that shippers and forwarders would employ either of these devices. In all probability,
arrangement (1) would simply not work. Conferences could easily frustrate it by applying its
blacklisting regulation to the forwarder in spite of his nonacceptance of brokerage from the
independent, on the ground that the forwarder was nevertheless "dealing with" an independent liner.
In most situations the loss to the forwarder resulting from blacklisting would be so great
that the shipper could not afford to provide the amount of reimbursement called for under
arrangement (2). This is largely because the forwarder could not afford to be concerned solely
with the immediate effects of loss of conference business but would have to consider the likelihood of long range detriment. The magnitude of this long range detriment would, in most
situations, be increased by the fact that even on routes where an independent liner is competing, conferences carry a substantial majority of the cargo, and by the ever present danger that
the independent carrier, typically a transitory operator, would pull out of the route if more
lucrative cargoes became available elsewhere.
39In re Gulf Brokerage and Forwarding Agreements, 1 U.S.S.B.B. 533, 535 (1936).
40 Whether conference brokerage agreements in this period included brokerage rules affecting independent non-conference competitors is not known. This information is contained in
the actual conference agreements filed with the Board for approval, and a search of these
agreements would be required to discover what particular rules conferences were then employing.
423 U.S.M.C. 170 (1949).
412 US.M.C. 775 (1946).
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but rather the narrow issue of whether conferences could prohibit brokerage
altogether. Nevertheless, these cases do indicate the Board's policy regarding
brokerage and provide a basis on which this policy can be analyzed.
The rule anounced in Agreements anud Practices Re Brokerage condemned
4
conference agreements forbidding all brokerage regardless of the circumstance.
This, the Board said, injured the forwarding industry by denying it earned fees,
and was, therefore, detrimental to commerce. 4 1 Such agreements would not be
approved and conferences were to comply by eliminating such rules from their
agreements. 45 In subsequent cases the Board explained the rule as also prohibiting conference rules setting brokerage below 11 per cent 4 or eliminating
certain long haul or heavy lift charges from the freight base on which brokerage
was estimated.47 The Board refused to give weight to conference arguments
that, because of competition among conference lines, the result of the Board's
policy would be automatic payment of brokerage. 48In 1957 the Board, in what
appears to foreshadow a change of policy, began to take heed of the conference
argum.ents. In the Pacific Coast European Conf. case4 9 the Board had before
it a conference agreement containing a prohibition of brokerage provision similar to that condemned in Agreement 7790.11 The conference refused to comply
with the ruling of that case and later cases on the ground that it had not been
a party thereto. The Board recognized that approval of the agreement before it
would have required an overruling of the policy announced in Agreement 7790
and followed in later cases. 51 The Board refused to approve the conference
agreement, but signified a shift from its prior policy by refusing to order the
conference to cease operating under its prohibition of brokerage clause.
41 Conference prohibition of brokerage in the face of external competition would, of course,
favor the competitor-whether an independent or a competing conference. Therefore it is not
believed that conferences attempt prohibition where actual or potential competition exists.
See note 25 supra.
443

U.S.M.C. at 177.

No order was entered by the Board; the conferences were given time to modify their
agreements. Injunctions against the Board were sought in actions brought by conferences on
both coasts. The courts denied the relief requested since the Board's findings were not unsupported by the evidence. Pacific Coast Westbound Conf. v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 936 (N.D
Calif. 1950), af'd on rehearing, 94 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Calif. 1950); Atlantic and Gulf/West
Coast Conf. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 554 (S.D. N.Y. 1950), affd on rehearing,94 F. Supp.
138 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
46 The opinion of the Board in Agreement 7790, 2 U.S.M.C. 775 (1946), included a finding
that 11 per cent was a required brokerage amount. In Agreements and Practices Re Brokerage,
3 U.S.M.C. 170, 177 (1949), the Board made a finding to that effect.
4
7Joint Board Docket Nos. 718/719. The Joint Committee of Foreign Freight Forwarders
Assn. v. Pacific Westbound Conf; Pacific Coast Customs and Freight Brokers Assn. v. Pacific
Westbound Conf., 4 F.M.B. 166 (1953).
48Agreements and Practices Re Brokerage, 3 U.S.M.C. 170, 174 (1949).
45

495

F.M.B. 225 (1957).

50See text at note 41 supra.

515 F.M.B. at 236.
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Declaring that the premises on which the earlier cases had been decided "may
not generally be true today,15 2 the Board announced that it would institute a
general investigation of brokerage and industry practice regarding automatic
payments. The examiner's report in the ensuing investigation 3 accepted the
confereilce arguments which had been urged unsuccessfully in 1946. To the
extent that a prediction of the Board's disposition of the matter is possible,
more recent Board statements5 4 would appear to point toward the adoption by
the Board of the examiner's report, and thus toward a repudiation of the
Board's earlier rule forbidding prohibitory conference regulations.
The Board's general brokerage policy tends to be obscured by the discussion in
the cases of prohibitory conference rules. The Board never abandoned its basic
position that brokerage was a proper subject of conference regulation. The only
conference rules condemned were those that flatly prohibited brokerage under
any circumstances. In the leading case, Agreements and PracticesRe Brokerage,

the Board stated its general view:
Nor is anything herein to be construed as a prohibition against carriers, acting under
a conference agreement, from establishing all reasonable rules or regulations which
will prevent the payment of brokerage under circumstances which would violate the
Act, or as a prohibitionagainst such carriersfrom placing limitationsupon the amounts
which they may pay.'

The Board rule forbidding prohibitory conference rules, although of serious
consequence to the carriers since they were compelled to pay automatic
brokerage as a result, 5 did not represent a radical shift of policy. The Board remained convinced that conference regulation of brokerage competition among
member lines was appropriate and proper.
Not only did the Board continue to approve conference rules forbidding
competition within the conferences, but in the Pacific Coast European Conf.
case of 1957 7 it suggested that the view first taken in 1936 11 approving the use
of brokerage as a device against independents might still be correct. Although
the Board refused to approve the conference brokerage rule in the 1957 casethe only case yet litigated directly involving a brokerage rule which was clearly
a competitive device against independents-its decision would not appear to
have general applicability to all blacklisting regulations. The blacklisting proat 237
Examiner's Preliminary Report, Docket No. 831 F.M.B. (March, 1960).
54The attitude of the Board toward the forwarding industry appears to have hardened in
recent years. It is believed that the Examiner's report reflects accurately this changing view.
Compare the statement of the Board in Agreements and Practices Re Brokerage, 3 U.S.M.C.
170, 174 (1949), with the examiner's conclusions in his report, supra note 53 at 34. See also
cases cited note 11 supra,for Board attitudes toward related brokerage questions.
53 U.S,.C. 170, 177 (1949) (Emphasis added).
16See text accompanying note 22 supra.
5Id.

53

574

F.M.B. 225 (1957).

"In Re Gulf Brokerage and Forwarding Agreements, 1 U.S.S.B.B. 533 (1936) (dictum).

See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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vision in PacificCoast EuropeanConf.,0 was held prima facie discriminatory because it "would foreclose a nonconference line from obtaining cargo through forwarders in this trade, and shippers who desire to ship nonconference in this trade
would be deprived of the services of freight forwarders."6 The Board made clear
that its disapproval was based upon the denial of forwarding services to shippers, and not on the use of brokerage as a competitive device. "We have not considered whether a rule which would merely prohibit payment of brokerage to a
broker who actually solicits for or receives brokerage payments from a competing nonconference line would be unjustly discriminatory ... or detrimental to
the commerce of the United States. Such a rule might under certain circumstances be shown to be proper and be approved.'?4I The inference to be drawn
from this dictum is, of course, conjectural in the absence of a specific holding.
However, approval of brokerage as a competitive device against independent
carriers is consistent with pre-IsbrandtsenBoard policy approving dual rate
contracts. The dictum would, therefore, appear to reflect Board thinking in
this area.

III.

APPLICATION

op IsbrandtsenTO

ITs IMPoRT r oR

B1OxERAGE REGULATION AND

FuTu. BOAp.D PoLIcY

The foregoing discussion of board policy and industry practice with regard
to brokerage indicates the close relationship between conference brokerage rules
and competitive forces in liner commerce. Three distinct types of conference
rules appear-those establishing uniform conference brokerage rates, those prohibiting brokerage payments, and those using brokerage as a competitive device
against independent liner competitors. Of the three types, the Isbrandtsencase62
would appear to have application only to conference rules using brokerage as a
competitive device against independents. In Isbrandtsen the Supreme Court
held that dual rate shipping contracts violated Section 14 Third of the Shipping
Act "when such practices are used to stifle the competition of independent carriers"" in liner commerce. The Court's construction of section 14 Third does not
make clear the breadth of the holding in the case nor does it indicate clearly
whether Isbrandtsen will be applied to conference brokerage rules. However it
would appear that the principle of decision-that conferences may not by
predatory means restrict independent liner operation-has direct application
to conference brokerage rules. Section 14 Third of the act prohibits carriers
under paragraphs First and Second from granting deferred rebates or utilizing
"fighting ships."8 4 Both were known conference devices against independents at
51 Discussed supra p. 783.
605 F.M.B. 225, 240 (1957).

62 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
6IId. at 495.
64 A fighting ship was a conference device directly undercutting the rates of a competitor.
61Id. at 241.

The conference would select a vessel belonging to one of its members to sail an identical route
with the competitor. The conference vessel would sail at rates so low as to drive the competitor
out of the trade. The member lines would share the cost of driving out the independent.
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the time the act was passed. Section 14 Third forbids carriers to "retaliate
against any shipper by refusing, or threatening to refuse, space accommodations
when such are available, or resort to other discriminatoryor -unfairmethods, because such shipper has patronized any other carrier or has filed a complaint
charging unfair treatment, or for any other reason."" Two arguments suggest
that Isbrandsen may not apply to conference brokerage regulation. First, the
basis for the decision may lie in the similarity between the specifically prohibited deferred rebates and dual rates. Since the purpose and effect of each is
essentially similar, the Court may have inferred a congressional intent to disapprove both. Secondly, the language of the section appears on its face limited
to cases of discrimination or unfairness directed against shippers. By this
reasoning Isbrandtsen would, therefore, be inapplicable to brokerage since
neither brokers nor independent carriers are protected persons under the section." These arguments appear to have been rejected by the reasoning of the
Isbrandtsen Court which did not read the section so narrowly.
Relying on the legislative history which "brought to light a number of
predatory practices by shipping conferences designed to give conferences
monopolies upon particular trades by forestalling outside competition and driving out all outsiders attempting to compete,"8 7 the Court found a congressional
plan outlawing "practices of the conferences which have the purpose and effect
of stifling the competition of independent carriers."6 8 The Court read section 14
as a protection of independent competition since it prohibited known conference
devices against independents. In sections 14 First and Second, Congress barred
specific known conference practices that it found undesirable. The first part of
section 14 Third also prohibited the known practice of conferences discriminating
against shippers using independent services. Viewing the section as a protection
of independents the Court found section 14 Third to be a "catch all" provision in
which Congress prohibited both conference practices known, but not widely
used, and those which might later be developed against independents. The inclusion of "fighting ships" in the prohibited categories supports this construction of the section, since fighting ships were used only against independent
carriers and never against shippers. Assuming, as the Court appears to have
72 Stat. 574 (1958), 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1958) (Emphasis added).
66The Court rejected the ejusdemn generis argument of the Board which would have related
section 14 Third entirely to discriminatory practices of conference against shippers by retaliatory practices. The Court said: "We do not believe that these constructions can be reconciled
with the language of the statutes or the scope of the congressional plan." 356 U.S. at 495-96
n.15. However, the view that section 14 Third is restricted to situations in which a shippercarrier tie is involved is supported by the Court's statement early in the opinion that "Congress
was unwilling to tolerate methods involving ties between conferences and shippers designed to
stifle independent carrier competition." Id. at 492 (Emphasis added). This narrow approach
would not achieve the congressional purpose as seen by the Court, and would seem inappropriate in the light of the Court's rejection of the ejesdern generis argument connecting the retaliation and "resort to" clauses of the section.
67
68
Id. at 488.
Id. at 491.
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done, that section 14 in its entirety is a protection of independent liners
against conference practices, it would appear unwarranted to limit the application of the section to cases where the conference practices also affect
shipper interests. Indeed, the purpose found by the Court would compel the
conclusion that the "resort to" clause applies equally to all conference actions
found unjust or discriminatory in operation and directed against independent
competition.
The Court clearly ruled in Isbrandtsen that the Shipping Act provisions are
not a carte blanche to conference regulation of the entire industry, although
the Board at times has appeared to think that they are. The Court emphasized "that the freedom allowed conference members to agree upon terms of
competition is limited to the freedom to agree upon terms regulating competition among themselves." 6 The dual rate contract struck down in Isbrandtsen
was condemned because, like its deferred rebate ancestor, its purpose and effect was predatory and eliminated independent competition. Not all dual rate
contracts were condemned in Isbrandtsen-only those found by the Board to be
predatory.70 The clear implication of the predatory requirement is that the
decision rests on the effect of conference practice on independent competition.
Deferred rebates, fighting ships and retaliatory denials of shipping space are all
specifically prohibited conference activities under the act. The effect of each is
the elimination of independent competition. Dual rates were condemned, although not specifically forbidden, for the same reason. It seems clear that conference brokerage regulations destroying independent competition fall within
the ambit of prohibited action under Section 14 Third of the Shipping Act.
A conference rule blacklisting brokers dealing with independents-such as that
impliedly approved in the PacificCoast EuropeanConf. case 7 -appears, in the
light of Isbrandtsen,to be prohibited by the act.
Conference regulation of brokerage competition among member lines, however, appears to be consistent with the policy of the Shipping Act as interpreted
in Isbrandtsen. Section 15 of the act provides for the filing of agreements "controlling, regulating, preventing or destroying competition"7 2 with the Board for
approval. The section appears to contemplate conference agreements affecting
competition, and clearly implies that the Board has power to approve them.
The congressional purpose in passing the act further supports this view. The act
was passed in the belief that compensatory rates could be achieved in liner commerce only through price fixing.7 3 Congress selected the private rate-making
6
9Ibid.
70
Id. at 499. It is of course difficult to conceive of a dual rate system that is not predatory
in the Isbrandisensense. This does not, however, detract from the doctrinal significance of the
"predatory" requirement in construing section 14.
715 F.M.B. 225 (1957).
7262

Stat. 1274 (1950), 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1958).
73 See Comment, supra note 5, at 604-05.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

agreements of conferences as the most appropriate device for accomplishing its
purpose. In granting conferences power to make rates without antitrust restriction Congress must also have intended that these rates be made effective. It
would be consistent with this purpose that conferences have the power to, regulate conditions of competition among members in order to maintain the established rates. Brokerage regulation does aid in maintenance of conference rates
and stability, and seems a proper subject of regulation. The Isbrandtsen Court
recognized conference power to regulate competition within the conference and
interposed no bar to rules limited in their application to internal conference
competition. An agreement establishing uniform conference brokerage rates
is, therefore, within the Board's power to approve.
Conference rules that prohibit brokerage entirely present a special and difficult problem. Prohibitory rules, since conferences are apparently unable to
impose them in the face of outside competition,7 4 are not "predatory" in the
Isbrandtsensense. At the same time their directly detrimental effect upon the
forwarding industry, which has no voice in their formulation, would appear to
be contrary to antitrust policy. The dilemma of the prohibitory rule is posed
by its effect in practice. Permitting such a rule denies forwarder-brokers compensation when properly earned.75 On the other hand, absent a prohibitory rule,
conference members tend to be forced into payment of brokerage on all shipments automatically. 7 Neither result is wholly satisfactory. The difficult problems presented, and the fact that the decision is dependent primarily upon
policy considerations-the conference interest in preventing automatic brokerage must be weighed against the forwarder interest in receiving brokerage
revenue-would seem to make determination of the proper rule a matter for
the Board's expert discretion.
74 See note 25 supra.
75 The Board in Agreement 7790, 2 U.S.M.C. 775 (1946), took the position that brokerage

was payable "only for securing cargo for the ship." This definition was affirmed in Agreements
and Practices Re Brokerage, 3 U.S.M.C. 170, 172 (1949).
76 See text accompanying note 22 supra.

